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Abstract. Execution paths expose non-functional information such as system
reliability and performance, which can be collected using runtime verification
techniques. Statistics gathering and evaluation can be very useful for processing
such information for areas ranging from performance profiling to user modelling
and intrusion detection. In this paper, we give an overview of LarvaStat — a
runtime verification tool extending L   [2] with the ability to straightforwardly
specify real-time related statistical properties. Being automaton-based, LarvaStat
also makes explicit the overhead induced by monitoring.
1 Introduction
Runtime verification tools mainly focus on the analysis of system traces for the veri-
fication of functional aspects of the system. However, system executions are also rich
in information related to non-functional system properties, such as system security, de-
pendability and performance. LarvaStat extends the runtime verification tool L   [2]
with the capability of collecting statistical information, and verifying non-functional
requirements based on such statistics. Taking security as an example application area,
LarvaStat allows for the characterisation of suspicious user behaviour through statistical
evaluation, which can subsequently be used to blacklist users deemed suspicious. This
mechanism has been applied to develop an intrusion detection system based on tech-
niques presented in [4] and an integrated system profiler used for measuring system
performance.
LarvaStat’s statistical constructs are based on the notion of incrementally computable
statistics [5], characterising a class of statistics which can be eÆciently evaluated in
both time and space. An incrementally computable statistic involves (i) storing the cur-
rent statistic’s valuation, and (ii) executing an update function when a new value is to
be added to the input data set. Many statistics such as the count, average, maximum,
minimum and variance all admit incrementally computable behaviour, although others,
such as the median, do not.
All statistics LarvaStat collects are themselves exposed to the monitoring tool as sta-
tistical events — exposing the latest statistic valuation upon each update. This allows
for (i) writing specifications based on these events (such as blocking users upon the
statistic valuation exceeding a certain threshold); and (ii) the specification of multilay-
ered statistics — statistics over statistics, such as the mean of the maximum download
file size.
Moreover, it is often the case that statistics are required to be collected only for
certain subtraces. For example, a statistic intent on counting the number of bytes sent
during some communication is only interested from the moment of opening to that of
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closing of a communication channel. LarvaStat allows for the specification of intervals
of interest for statistics.
2 LarvaStat
LarvaStat is an event-driven runtime verification framework, and is concerned with in-
terpreting observed event information. Parametrised events can be either observable
system actions (such as a method call), timer events, automata-generated events or a
combination thereof.
Definition 1. Given a set basicevent of basic events (parametrised over a set of values
V) and set timer of timer variables, we define a composite parametrised event event as
either (i) a basic event, (ii) a timeout on a timer (over  ), (iii) a choice between events
through the general choice operator , or (iv) the complement of an event (e).
event :: basicevent   timer @ Æ     2event   event
The first statistical construct is the statistic aggregator, and is defined as (i) an initial
statistic valuation (eg. initialising the count), and (ii) an update rule (eg. incrementing
the count upon the occurrence of an event).
Definition 2. A statistical aggregator ranging over  is defined through (i) the initial
memory value 0  ; and (ii) the update rule entailing a parametrised event (trig-
gering the update), a condition (acting as an event filter), an update function on the
memory, and an event on which to signal the updated value. We assume that values
over  can be mapped to V to pass the value over the output event.
event  V  (cond  (  ))  event
Note that cond stands for a condition on the system state and timer configuration.
Given a sequence of timestamps, basic events and system states (ti ei(vi) i) (with i
ranging from 1 to n) and statistical aggregator with initial memory 0 and update action
(in s out), statistical events would be triggered at each point in the trace where a basic
event ei(vi) triggers in and such that the condition is triggered — c holds, where (c u) 
s(vi). At each such position,  (starting with value 0) is updated to u(), with the
result being output as an event: out(u()). Formal definitions of trace semantics of event
triggering are given in [2].
Example 1. A statistical aggregator counting the number of bytes sent requires memory
storage containing the current amount, and is initialised to 0. The statistic is updated on
each basic even send(v) (v represents the number of bytes sent), with the update action
defined as: (send v(xtrue nn  v) result).
See Fig. 1(a) for an example point statistic written in LarvaStat, specifying a statistic
aggregator for counting the number of successful user logins.
LarvaStat also supports statistics evaluated over intervals of interest, defined as a
statistic aggregator and an interval characterisation. This interval dictates which system
trace subsequence is relevant to the specified statistic aggregator. Intervals are char-
acterised by identifying the opening and closing events (eg. an interval specifying the
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opening and closing of a connection channel). Through the use of timers, one can use
this approach to define intervals by giving the opening event and the duration of time
during which to calculate the statistic (eg. a statistic counting the number of user down-
loads in the first thirty minutes of logging in).
Definition 3. Statistics aggregation over an interval of interest is defined as (i) a statis-
tic aggregator; (ii) the event and condition marking the interval opening event  V 
cond; and (iii) the event and condition marking the interval closing V  (event V 
cond).
Note that the closing event is also parametrised by the parameter given to the opening
event. Every time an opening event (satisfying the condition) is triggered, a new statistic
aggregator is created and initialised, which continues calculating the value until the
closing event appears.
Example 2. A statistical aggregator over interval of interest evaluating the number of
bytes sent on a per connection basis is defined through (i) the statistic aggregator de-
fined in example 1, (ii) interval opening (openConnection,porttrue), and (iii) interval
closing port0(closeConnection port1port0  port1). Note that it is assumed that
both openConnection and closeConnection are parametrised by the port number.
See Fig. 1(b) for an example interval statistic written in LarvaStat, specifying the statis-
tic aggregator over interval of interest defined above (ignoring port number to simplify
presentation).
3 Case Study
LarvaStat has been used for implementing a probabilistic intrusion detection and inte-
grated system profiler sitting above an ftpd server implemented in Java1. The system
profiler is responsible for quantifying system performance, whereas the intrusion de-
tection system observes user behaviour, with the aim of capturing suspicious behaviour
through the use of misuse detection and anomaly detection techniques [4]. Moreover,
given that the monitoring of users is expensive, an additional mechanism has been im-
plemented for the probabilistic choice of users to monitor. This choice is dependent
on two parameters: user risk factor and system load. Both parameters are extrapolated
from statistical information collected by LarvaStat.
System profiling is carried out by quantifying the current system load (assuming that
the server’s performance is tightly bound to bandwidth usage and the current count
of logged in users), and analysing system load history for predictive purposes. For
example, counting the number of currently logged in users is specified through three
statistics, as seen in Fig. 1(a). UsersLoggedIn counts the number of user logins, User-
sLoggedOut counts the number of log out events, while CurrentUserCount is a layered
statistic which listens to the previous two statistics.
The intrusion detection uses various techniques, (i) a Markov chain analysing the
user’s command sequence, with each ftpd command being related to a risk factor, and
1 http:  www.anomic.de AnomicFTPServer
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marking the user as suspicious if the command sequence exceeds a threshold; and (ii)
the use of statistical moments for the characterisation of abnormal user behaviour, mon-
itoring each user’s download and upload behaviour patterns, and assuming a statistically
predictable pattern.
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Fig. 1. LarvaStat statistic construct examples (a) and (b)
Fig. 2 shows automata (which are processed by L  ) which are automatically gen-
erated by LarvaStat to calculate the statistics UsersLoggedIn and byteCount from the
description in Fig. 1. Transitions are tagged by the event which fires them, the event
which they fire, and the action to update the statistic. The initial state is tagged with the
action to initialise the statistic. LarvaStat does not extend L  ’s expressivity, but rather
is a syntactic sugar for the intuitive high-level specification of statistical properties.
usersLoggedIn Events,u1)
S0 S1
UsersLoggedIn.setValue(new Integer(0))
S0
(downloadStarting, ,skip)
(downloadComplete, ,skip)
(sendInfo,byteCount Event,u2)
byteCount.setValue(new Integer(0))
(successfulLogin,
Fig. 2. DATEs executing statistical constructs (a) and (b)
The case study contains the specification of twenty statistics, some of which are
evaluated on the system, whereas others are evaluated on a per user basis. All statistics
are incrementally computable and intuitively defined, while also being implemented
without altering a line of the underlying ftpd system code.
System overhead was measured by simulating multiple users logging in concurrently
and exhibiting varied download and upload behaviour patterns. This setting was run
multiple times with and without the additional intrusion detection system, whereby
the system on average exhibited approximately a 9% processing overhead while being
monitored.
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4 Related Work and Conclusions
Three existing related approaches have been identified. The approach in [5] specifies
a framework focusing on the asynchronous collection of statistics over runtime execu-
tions. This is achieved by presenting a Linear Temporal Logic extension focused on
evaluating numerical queries on the trace, and admits a tractable evaluation strategy
given complete trace knowledge. Lola [3] is another tool, and presents a functional
stream computation language allowing for the expression of system properties, numer-
ical queries as well as guaranteeing bounded memory requirements. EAGLE [1] is a
third approach, whose use of meta operators allows for the encoding of multiple for-
malisms such as interval temporal logics, finite state automata, as well as logics for the
expression of numerical queries. Our approach supports real-time related statistics col-
lection, and enables interval masking over traces. The automaton-based approach, also
makes explicit the overhead induced by monitoring over and above that due to statistics
state storage and update.
LarvaStat shows the potential of applying runtime verification techniques for the col-
lection of non-functional metrics about the system being monitored, which can then be
used to verify properties over these metrics. By extending an existing runtime verifi-
cation tool, the resulting framework is able to both collect statistics over system exe-
cutions, as well as monitoring system properties quantified through statistical queries.
The ftpd case study, shows the applicability of the approach, by adding probabilistic
intrusion detection and a system profiler to an existing tool.
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